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We classify and analyze bit errors in the voltage and current measurement modes of the Kirchhoff-
law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system. In both measurement modes, the error 
probability decays exponentially with increasing duration of the bit sharing period (BSP) at fixed 
bandwidth. We also present an error mitigation strategy based on the combination of voltage-
based and current-based schemes. The combination method has superior fidelity, with drastically 
reduced error probability compared to the former schemes, and it also shows an exponential 
dependence on the duration of the BSP.  
Keywords: Information theoretic security; secure key distribution via wire KLJN; bit errors. 
1.   Introduction 
This paper classifies and analyzes different types of errors, due to statistical inaccuracies 
in noise measurements, within the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) system1,2 and 
demonstrates a new and efficient way of removing these errors.3,4 It is a summary of 
recent findings presented in Refs. 3 and 4.  
We first present a brief description of the working principle of the KLJN system.1-4 
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1.1 The Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise secure key distribution 
 
The KLJN secure key exchange has been proven to give information-theoretic security.5,6 
This key distribution scheme is based on Kirchhoff’s loop law of quasi-static 
electrodynamics and the fluctuation-dissipation theorem of statistical physics.1-9 Figure 1 
shows the ideal KLJN scheme.1-4 The core channel is a wire line to which the two 
communicating parties, denoted “Alice” and “Bob”, connect their resistors AR  and BR , 
respectively. These resistors are randomly chosen from the set { }0 1,R R , with 0 1R R≠ , 
where 0R  and 1R  represent the different bit values. At the beginning of each bit sharing 
period (BSP), Alice and Bob—who have identical pairs of resistors—randomly select and 
connect one of these resistors to the wire line. Therefore there are four possible bit 
situations in which these two pairs of resistors can be connected to the wire line: 00, 01, 
10 and 11.  
 
Fig. 1. Outline of the core KLJN secure key exchange scheme without defense circuitry (current/voltage 
monitoring/comparison) against invasive (active) attacks or attacks utilizing non-ideal components and 
conditions. effT  is the effective noise temperature of the Gaussian noise voltage generators, AR , ( )Au t , BR , 
and ( )Bu t  are the resistor values and noise voltages at Alice and Bob, respectively. ( )cu t  and ( )ci t  are channel 
noise voltage and current, respectively. 
 
 
The cases when Alice and Bob use the same resistance values—i.e., the 00 and 11 
situations—represent a non-secure bit exchange. The situations when Alice and Bob use 
different resistance values—i.e., the 01 and 10 bit situations—signify a secure bit 
exchange event because, according to the Second Law of Thermodynamics,3-6 Eve cannot 
distinguish between them through measurements, and whenever Alice and Bob see the 
01/10 situation they know that the other party has the complementary bit value, which 
means that they can infer the full bit arrangement. Thus a secure bit has been generated 
and shared. 
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1.2. KLJN bit interpretations  
Assuming ideal components/conditions, we proceed as in earlier works.3,4 Let us assume 
that Alice and Bob measure the mean-square channel noise voltage and/or current 
amplitudes, i.e., 2 ||( ) 4c eff KLJNu t kT R Bτ =  and/or 
2 1( ) 4c eff KLJN
loop
i t kT B
Rτ
= , respectively, 
where k  is Boltzmann’s constant, KLJNB  is channel noise bandwidth, 
|| / ( )A B A BR R R R R= + , loop A BR R R= + , and τ  indicates finite-time average. Statistical 
errors (random fluctuations) appear due to the finite duration time τ  of the BSP.3,4 
Figure 23,4 illustrates the three possible levels of the measured mean-square channel 
noise voltage and current for the 11, 01/10, and 00 bit situations. The threshold values 
1,∆ 2∆  and 3∆ , 4∆  are used to determine the boundaries between the different 
interpretations of the measured mean-square channel noise voltages and currents, 
respectively, over the time window τ . 
 
Fig. 2. Measured mean-square channel noise of voltage (a) and current (b). 211( )u t τ , 
2
01/10 ( )u t τ , 
2
00 ( )u t τ  and 
2
11( )i t τ , 
2
01/10( )i t τ , 
2
00 ( )i t τ  are measured mean-square channel noise voltage and current at the 11, 01/10 and 
00 bit situations, respectively. The solid lines with the quantities in  represent ideal (infinite-time) averages. 
For the sake of simplicity we assume 0R R=  and 1R Rα= ,
 
with 1α >> . 
 
The bit interpretations of the measured mean-square channel noise voltage3 and 
current4 are 00 when 
 
u
ch
2 (t)
τ
< u00
2 (t) + ∆1  and 2 200 4( ) ( )ci t i tτ > − ∆ , respectively. 
The interpretations are 11 when 2 211 2( ) ( )chu t u tτ > − ∆  and 
2 2
11 3( ) ( )ci t i tτ < + ∆ , 
respectively. The secure bit situations 01/10 are interpreted as such when 
In
t. 
J. 
M
od
. P
hy
s. 
Co
nf
. S
er
. 2
01
4.
33
. D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c.
co
m
by
 8
1.
0.
12
3.
19
0 
on
 0
2/
12
/1
6.
 F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
Y. Saez et al. 
 
1460367-4 
2 2 2
00 1 11 2( ) ( ) ( )chu t u t u tτ+ ∆ ≤ ≤ − ∆  and 
2 2 2
11 3 00 4( ) ( ) ( )ci t i t i tτ+ ∆ ≤ ≤ − ∆ , 
respectively. 
2.   Error analysis in the KLJN system  
Bit errors occur when the protocol makes incorrect bit interpretations due to statistical 
inaccuracies in the measured mean-square noise voltage and/or current. There are 
different types of errors situations, as shown in Table 1.3,4 
 
Table 1. Types of errors in the KLJN bit exchange scheme. 
  Actual Situation 
  00 11 01/10 
 
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
In
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n
 
(D
ec
isi
o
n
) 00 
Correct 
(no error) 
Error, removed 
(automatically) 
Error, removed 
(automatically) 
 
11 
Error, removed 
(automatically) 
Correct 
(no error) 
Error, removed 
(automatically) 
 
01/10 
Error 
(probability?) 
Error 
(probability?) 
Correct 
(no error) 
 
It is apparent that two types of errors need to be addressed: the 11==>01/10 errors—
i.e., the errors when the actual situation 11 is interpreted as the secure noise level 01/10—
and the 00==>01/10 errors occurring when the actual situation 00 is interpreted as 01/10. 
Figure 3 shows a block diagram for the measurement process. The channel voltage 
and/or current first enter a squaring unit. For typical practical applications, the output 
signal is a voltage, because the squaring unit employs voltage-signal-based electronics. 
Thus when measuring the current, for the sake of simplicity and without losing 
generality, we assume that the numerical values of the voltage correspond to the 
measured current. 
 
Fig. 3 Mean-square channel noise voltage and/or current measurement process. Q  and D  are calibration 
coefficients of the squaring device to provide a Volt unit with the correct numerical value for the squaring 
operation. 
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 The measured mean-square channel noise voltage and/or current for the finite-time 
average τ  have a DC and a superimposed AC component ( )tµ  remaining after the 
finite-time average.3,4 This averaging process can be represented as low-pass filtering 
with a cut-off frequency 1/Bf τ≈ . The AC component ( )tµ  of the finite-time average is 
Gaussian with high accuracy,3,4,10 which follows from the Central Limit Theorem because 
τ
 is much larger than the correlation time for the AC component before averaging (
B KLJNf B<< ). We estimate the error probability with the probability that ( )tµ
 
is crossing 
a threshold during the time interval τ . To compute this probability, we follow a 
procedure that is analogous to the one in Refs. 3 and 4, specifically by using Rice’s 
formula11,12 for threshold crossings.  
2.1. General approach 
We suppose that ∆  is the threshold value used to determine the boundaries between the 
different interpretations of ( )tµ  over the time window τ . If we define 
,
( )ACS fτ  as the 
power density spectrum of ( )tµ , the mean frequency of level crossing can be given as 
2
2
,2 0
2( ) exp ( )
ˆ ˆ2 AC
f S f dfτν µ µ
∞ −∆∆ =  
 
∫ ,                                       (1)                                    
where 
,0
ˆ ( )ACS f dfτµ
∞
= ∫  is the RMS value of ( )tµ  and the threshold value ∆  is 
defined, for normalization purposes, as a fraction of the measured mean-square channel 
noise voltage and/or current, namely 2 ( )cDu tϕ∆ =  and/or 2 ( )cQi tϕ∆ =  for 0 1ϕ< < , 
respectively. According to Ref. 10, the power density spectrum ( )ACS f  for the AC 
component
 
of the non-averaged quantity 2 ( )cu t  and/or 2 ( )ci t  is  
2 2( ) 2 ( )(1 )
2AC KLJN c KLJN
fS f D B S f
B
= − , for 0 2 KLJNf B≤ ≤ ,                              (2)                     
and ( ) 0ACS f =  otherwise, where ( )cS f  is the power density spectrum of the mean-
square channel noise voltage and/or current.  
The low-pass filtering effect of the time averaging cuts off this spectrum for Bf f>  
but keeps the ( )ACS f  spectrum for Bf f< . Since B KLJNf B<< , the value of ( )ACS f  
within the frequency band Bf  can be approximated by its maximum, so that 
,
( ) (0)AC ACS f Sτ ≈ . Therefore, by setting /KLJN BB fγ =  one obtains that the frequency 
( )ν ↑ ∆  of unidirectional level crossings (half of the level crossing frequency predicted by 
Rice’s formula) is 
2
( ) exp
43
Bf ϕ γν ↑
 −∆ =  
 
.                                                       (3) 
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In the high-threshold situation, the errors follow Poisson statistics and thus the error 
probability during a time interval is equal to the expected number of errors within this 
interval provided this number is much less than one. Thus the probability ε  in the case of 
1ε <<  is 
2( ) 1( ) exp
43Bf
ν ϕ γ
ε ν τ ↑↑
∆  −
≈ ∆ ≈ =  
 
.                                       (4) 
2.2. Statistical errors in the voltage and current measurement modes 
In this section, the threshold values 1∆ , 2∆  and 3∆ , 4∆  have meanings that are similar to 
the one of the threshold value ∆
 
in the general approach presented above and are also 
defined as a fraction of the corresponding measured mean-square channel noise voltage 
and current, namely: 21 00 ( )Du tβ∆ =  for 0 1β< < , 22 11( )Du tδ∆ =  for 0 1δ< < , 
2
3 11( )Qi tλ∆ =  for 0 1λ< < , and 24 00 ( )Qi tρ∆ =  for 0 1ρ< < . 
       Substituting 1∆
 
or 2∆  in Eq. (4), we find that the probabilities 00ε  and 11ε  of the 
00==>01/10 and 11==>01/10 types of errors in voltage measurements3 for 00 1ε <<  are 
              
2
1
00
( ) 1
exp
43Bf
ν β γ
ε ↑
∆  −
≈ =  
 
, for 0 1β< < ,                                   (5) 
              
2
2
11
( ) 1
exp
43Bf
ν δ γ
ε ↓
∆  −
≈ =  
 
, for 0 1δ< < ,                                    (6) 
respectively. 
       Similarly, by substituting 3∆
 
and 4∆
 
in Eq. (4) we find that the error probabilities 
,11iε  and ,00iε  of the 11==>01/10 and 00==>01/10 types of errors in current 
measurements4 are                              
                             
2
3
,11
( ) 1
exp
43i Bf
ν λ γ
ε ↑
∆  −
≈ =  
 
, for 0 1λ< < ,                                  (7)                                                     
 
2
4
,00
( ) 1
exp
43i Bf
ν ρ γ
ε ↓
∆  −
≈ =  
 
, for 0 1ρ< < ,                                 (8) 
respectively. 
It should be noticed that—for both the voltage-based and the current-based 
methods—the error probabilities are exponential functions of the parameter γ , which 
shows that the error probability decays exponentially with increasing magnitude of τ . 
2.3. Illustration of the results with practical parameters 
To demonstrate the results, we assign practical values to the parameters in Eq. (4). For 
100γ =  and 0.5ϕ = , the bit error probability is 0.001ε = . Increasing γ  by a factor of 
two (and analogously the time average window τ ) results in 610ε −≈ , which is 
satisfactory for many applications.  
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In our case of 1α >>  the mean square noise current level at 11 is much closer to the 
value at 01/10 than to the value at 00 (cf. Fig. 2), and hence 
,00iε << ,11iε . This situation is 
reversed for the case of the voltage-based method, where 00ε >> 11ε . 
2.4. A combined current–voltage error removal strategy 
We assume that Alice and Bob measure both 2
cu τ
 and 2
ci τ  at the same time. In an 
ideal error-free situation, the same bit interpretations ensue from both mean-square 
channel noise amplitudes. However the bit interpretations can differ when there are 
errors, because the current and voltage amplitudes are statistically independent due to 
Gaussianity and the Second Law of Thermodynamics.1-6 To eliminate errors, we keep 
only those cases where both the current and voltage methods interpret 01/10 bit values. 
Table 2 illustrates this situation.4 
 
Table 2 KLJN error removal method with combined current and voltage analysis. 
  Voltage measurement interpretation 
  00 11 01/10 
C
u
rr
en
t 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n
 
00 00 
(Insecure/Discard) 
Discard 
(check attack) 
00 
(Insecure/Discard) 
 
11 
Discard 
(check attack) 
11 
(Insecure/ 
Discard) 
11 
(Insecure/ 
Discard) 
 
01/10 
00 
(Insecure/ 
Discard) 
11 
(Insecure/ 
Discard) 
01/10 
(Secure) 
 
        Due to their independence, the error probabilities in the combined current-voltage 
method are the product of the error probabilities of the current-based and voltage-based 
schemes.4 The resultant probabilities 
,00tε  and ,11tε  of 00==>01/10 and 11==>01/10 types 
of errors are4  
2 2
,00 00 ,00
1 ( )
exp
3 4t i
γ β ρ
ε ε ε
 
− +
= =  
 
, for 0 1β< <  and 0 1ρ< < ,                (9)                              
2 2
,11 11 ,11
1 ( )
exp
3 4t i
γ δ λ
ε ε ε
 
− +
= =  
 
, for 0 1δ< <  and 0 1λ< < ,                   (10) 
respectively.  
 These error probabilities are again exponential functions of the parameter γ . For the 
practical parameters 100γ =  and 0.5β ρ= =  we find that 6
,00 1.24 10tε
−
= × , which is 
drastically less than with the former methods. If the duration of the bit exchange period, 
i.e., γ , is increased by a factor of two, the total bit error probability 
,00tε  is decreased to 
12
,00 4.6 10tε
−
≈ × . Similar improvements can be found for 
,11tε  . 
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Although in the experimental setup presented in Ref. 9 we used a slightly modified 
decision table, the joint use of voltage and current detection had already been found 
suitable for decreasing error ratios. In addition, the results presented in current article are 
in good agreement with the experimental results. 
3. Conclusion 
This paper has classified and analyzed the types of errors in the KLJN key exchange for 
both voltage-based and current-based schemes. These error probabilities showed an 
exponential dependence on the duration of the bit exchange. Furthermore, we presented 
an enhanced error mitigation method, based on the combination of the voltage-based and 
current-based schemes, which operates without any error correction algorithm.  
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